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Consider two types of residents, who prefer two diﬀerent values of
a policy. A current majority in some city, seeking to increase the prob-
ability that it will set policy in the following period, may adopt cur-
rent policies that are particularly unattractive to the minority, leading
some members of the minority to emigrate. Such behavior can lead
to extremist policies, to wasteful taxes, and to similar ineﬃciencies.
11 Introduction
Jurisdictions sometimes adopt policies that a majority of their citizens op-
pose. This paper considers one reason voters may favor policies that hurt
them in the short run: such policies may induce emigration of residents with
diﬀerent preferences, thereby tilting expected policy in the future toward
policies the current majority favors. For example, suppose a city consists of
a majority of parents with young school-age children and a minority without
children. Parents want high spending on schools both now and in the future.
Not guaranteed that their majority status will persist, parents may vote for
excessive school spending now to make the city less attractive to childless
voters, who may emigrate, thus raising the likelihood that parents retain
their majority status in the future.
Similar eﬀects can arise with other kinds of policies. Liberal voters in
Santa Monica, California may favor generous treatment of the homeless not
only out of sympathy for them, but also because the current liberal majority
may want to induce migration of conservative residents who ﬁnd the pres-
ence of the homeless especially uncomfortable. Such migration solidiﬁes the
political power of the initial majority, ensuring that future homeless policies
agree with their preferences. Orthodox voters in Jerusalem may want to
close all places of entertainment on the Sabbath, including those they will
never frequent, because such closure makes the city less attractive to secular
people, ensuring that future policies will also be strict. A Long Island suburb
may impose high property taxes and impose large minimum-lot requirements
not only because the current residents value schools and low density, but also
because the residents want few poor people, who could aﬀect future policy
as voters, to live there.
We shall illustrate this idea in a simple two-period model with two types
of voters, who diﬀer in their preferences on the level of a governmental policy
variable (denoted z). After the vote outcome in period 0, members of a given
t y p em a yl e a v et h ec i t yi ft h ec h o s e nz level is too far from their ideal point.
Such emigration is governed by heterogeneous moving costs, which means
that the number of migrants rises continuously as the z level becomes more
unfavorable. Because random voter turnout makes future vote outcomes
uncertain even with ﬁxed population shares, each group has an incentive to
generate emigration of the other type through its z proposal in period 0.
As a result, each group advocates an extreme policy in that period. High
demanders propose a z higher than their short-term preferred level, while
2low demanders propose a z lower than their short-term preferred level.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Several previous papers are closely related to our work. Using static models,
Wilson (1998) and Hoyt and Lee (2003) show that consumers in high-income
communities have an incentive to overprovide public goods in order to en-
courage exit of the poor. However, in contrast to our model, the poor are
expelled to eliminate the current burden of subsidizing their public consump-
tion, rather than to shape the composition of the future electorate, ensuring
the dominance of high-income preferences. Thus, our paper gives a diﬀer-
ent perspective on extremism by oﬀering an explicitly dynamic model based
on electoral uncertainty, where initial policies aﬀect the future outcomes via
emigration.
Like Wilson (1998) and Hoyt and Lee (2003), Epple and Romer (1991)
present a static model where voters choose local policies taking account of
their impact on the intercommunity migration equilibrium. However, be-
cause the model focuses on intercommunity redistribution, not public-good
provision, the notion of extremism does not arise.1
While the above papers present general equilibrium models, our frame-
work takes a partial equilibrium approach, focusing on incentives within a
single community without providing a full treatment of the intercommunity
equilibrium. Another paper on extremism that follows such an approach is
Glaeser and Shleifer (2005). These authors focus on Mayor Curley of Boston,
who used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary
rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from the city, thereby shap-
ing the electorate in his favor. Curley won elections, but Boston stagnated.
Our model resembles Glaeser and Schleifer’s in considering how current pol-
icy aﬀects migration and thus future policy, but it diﬀers in several ways.
Whereas they focus on the incentives of incumbent oﬃcials, we consider the
preferences of residents. Whereas Glaeser and Shleifer consider redistribu-
tion, we allow for a broader range of policies, showing how rational citizens
may prefer a policy more extreme than the one which, absent migration, they
would most prefer. Lastly, whereas Glaeser and Shleifer consider redistribu-
1Since low-income voters prefer full expropriation of the rich while high-income voters
prefer zero redistribution, an interior ideal point that can be used as a reference point for
extremism does not exist.
3tion that necessarily beneﬁts the favored group, we consider a policy that
under standard criteria is Pareto inferior: we show that the majority may
favor a policy that hurts all citizens in the short run, including members of
the majority.2
We also build on previous work that shows how a current majority at-
tempts to aﬀect future policy. Incumbents may favor budget deﬁcits [Alesina
and Tabellini (1988), Tabellini and Alesina (1990)] or ineﬃcient tax systems
[Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992)] to limit a future government’s
ability to adopt policies the current government opposes. Glazer (1989) ar-
gues that collective choices will show a bias towards durable projects, partly
because durability ensures that the current majority can obtain the services
it prefers in future periods when a diﬀerent policymaker may be in power. A
survey of this literature is provided by Alesina and Perotti (1995).
In contrast to the genesis of extremism in our model, this phenomenon
can also arise when a party reﬂects the preferences of its activists, who are
more extreme than other voters or party members (see Aldrich (1983)). By
contrast, Glazer, Gradstein, and Konrad (1998) argue that a government
may adopt extreme policies (policies distant from the ideal points of both the
decisive voter and of the ruling party) for electoral purposes. The incumbent
creates a cost to voters of changing the party in power by setting a policy so
extreme that the challenger would change it despite the heavy cost of making
the change. But swing voters may be more concerned than politicians about
these costs, and have more moderate policy preferences. Those who expect
the challenger to implement the costly policy change and want to avoid it
will therefore support the incumbent.
Lastly, our paper relates to the behavior of religious groups, which may
require strict observances with the aim of discouraging free riders (people who
enjoy the religious fervor of others but show little themselves) from joining
the group.3
2Nastassine (2005) considers a citizen-candidate model, exploring how mobility aﬀects
a person’s willingness to run for oﬃce and showing how increased mobility can shift policy
outcome towards the preferred policy of the less mobile citizens.
3For a survey of the relevant work, see Iannacone (1997).
43 The Model
3.1 Basic assumptions
The city contains two types of voters, denoted a and b.T h e t y p e s p r e f e r
diﬀerent levels of a government policy variable, denoted z. Preferences for
the two types are represented by the strictly concave utility functions ua(z)
and ub(z). As an example, suppose individuals consume a publicly-provided
private good z produced at unit cost c and a conventional private good x
bought on the market. Then, ua(z) ≡  ua(y − cz,z), where  ua(·)g i v e st y p e -
a preferences for x and z consumption, and y is income. Alternatively, z
could represent the levels of other kinds of government policies not involving
expenditures, such as the strength of aﬃrmative action, the stringency of
building codes, etc. We do assume, however, that utilityfrom the government
policy is independent of the city’s population size.
The model has two time periods, denoted 0 and 1. In each period, two
citizen-candidates, one from each voter type, compete in an election.4 The
level of the policy variable in a given period is set according to the preferences
of the winning candidate, who attracts voters of his type.
In each election, random voter turnout helps determine the outcome. The
identity of the majority group among voters is thus a random variable whose
distribution depends the city’s population composition. Let θ0 denote the
proportion of a-types in the city’s population in period-0, with θ1 denoting
the proportion in period 1. Then, the probability that the a-types are decisive







The function G naturally satisﬁes G (·) > 0. Thus, as the population share
of the a-types increases in a given period, their probability of being decisive
in that period’s election rises. Moreover, as θi approaches unity, G(θi)m u s t
do so as well. However, G could reach unity while θi is still well below 1,
indicating that type-a decisiveness is certain once θi is suﬃciently large.
Although θ0, the proportion of a-types in period-0, is exogenous, the
proportion θ1 in period 1 can be aﬀected by emigration from the city. Such
4Since we have only two types of voters, our model greatly simpliﬁes the citizen-
candidate models introduced by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate
(1997)).
5emigration is in turn determined by the government policy chosen in period
0. Thus, each voter type sets its proposed z level in period 0 with an eye
toward this emigration, attempting to increase its chances of being decisive
in period 1.
3.2 Setting up the choice problem
To analyze the choice problem, it is useful to consider ﬁrst the objective func-
tion of an individual of a particular type (an a-type), with the determinants
of emigration considered later. Observe that, since there is no future beyond
period 1, each type will propose a z level in that period to maximize its cur-
rent utility. In other words, the type-a candidate will propose the period-1
policy that maximizes ua(za). The resulting policy is denoted z∗
a and referred
to as the type-a voter’s ideal point. Since each type proposes its ideal point









b) is the utility of a type-a person when the b-types are decisive
in period 1.
To write the overall objective function, let the policy proposed by an a-
type candidate in period 0 be denoted z0
a. Then, conditional on being decisive










where δ is the intertemporal discount factor, which is common across types.5
Through emigration, the proposed z0
a level, if adopted by the voters, af-
fects the population proportion θ1 and thus the probability that the a-types
are decisive in period 1. To see how, let ub denote the utility available to
b-types outside the city in each period, which can be enjoyed if the individual
moves, emigrating from the city. We assume that such emigration occurs at
5Eq. (3) gives the relevant portion of a broader type-a objective function, which gives
expected utility prior to the period-0 election. That function is
π
0 · (discounted expected utility | a-types decisive in period 0) +
(1 − π0) · (discounted expected utility | b-types decisive in period 0)
Since the second-half of this expression is independent of z0
a and π0 is a constant, (3) is
the relevant objective function.
6the beginning of period 0, immediately after the election reveals the chosen
government policy. Emigrating, however, entails a moving cost of mb,w h o s e
magnitude is speciﬁc to the individual. Thus, after emigrating, discounted







a)+( 1 − π
0)ub(z
∗
b)] < (1 + δ)ub − mb, (4)
or if
mb <τ b − ub(z
0
a), (5)
where τb equals (1+δ)ub minus the second expression on the left-hand side of
(4). Thus, the people who emigrate are those with low moving costs. Note in
( 4 )t h a tab-type computes the expected post-election utility from remaining
in the city, given by the left-hand side of the expression, assuming that no
one else emigrates. As a result, the probability that the a-types are decisive
in period 1 remains at π0.
Let f(·) denote the density of moving costs, which is common to both




f(mb)dmb = F[τb − ub(z
0
a)], (6)
where mb is the minimal mb value and F(·) is the c.d.f. corresponding to f(·).
We assume that some, but not all, b-types emigrate when z0
a is set at z∗
a,t h e
ideal point of a type-a voter. Given (6), this assumption requires satisfaction
of the inequalities
mb <τ b − ub(z
∗
a) < mb, (7)
where mb is the maximal mb value. Note that (7) implies f[τb − ub(z∗
a)] > 0.
Taking account of type-b emigration, the proportion θ1 of the population
that is type-a in period 1 can be derived as a function of z0
a, which in turn
yields the relationship between π1 and z0
a via (1). With this information in
hand, the optimal value of z0
a can be computed by maximizing Va in (3).
To explore the details of this maximization, let n0
a and n0
b denote the
type-a and type-b populations in period 0. Recognizing that the period-1
type-b population equals (1 − F)n0























1 − (1 − θ0)F
, (8)






1 − (1 − θ0)F

. (9)
We assume that, when the F argument of G in (9) is evaluated at z0
a = z∗
a
using (6), π1 < 1h o l d s .T h u s ,w h e nz0
a is set at the type-a ideal point, type-a
decisiveness in period 1 is not assured. Note that this assumption implies
that G  > 0h o l d sw h e nz0
a = z∗
a.




















where Ω ≥ 0 refers to the ﬁrst three terms in (10), which depend on z0
a via
G , f,a n dF.
Without loss of generality, suppose the a-types are the high demanders
of the government policy, so that z∗
a >z ∗
b. Then, consider values of z0
a
greater than z∗
b. At such values, which are natural candidates for the type-a
optimum, u 
b(z0
a) is negative. Provided that Ω(z0
a) is positive, ∂π1/∂z0
a is then
also positive, indicating that the probability that the a-types are decisiverises
as z0
a increases. The reason, of course, is that an increase in z0
a pushes the
government policy farther away from the ideal point of the b-types, leading to
more emigration and fewer remaining members of this group in the period-1
population.
While the maintained assumptions ensure that Ω(z0
a) and hence ∂π1/∂z0
a
is positive when z0
a is near z∗
a, the derivative can be zero otherwise. If z0
a
assumes a value such that τb − ub(z0
a) <m b,t h e nn ob-types emigrate and a
marginal increase in z0
a has no eﬀect on π1 (the relevant z0
a values lie close to
z∗
b). Conversely, if τb − ub(z0
a) > mb holds (requiring a z0
a value above z∗
a),
then all the b-types emigrate, and an increase in z0
a again has no eﬀect on π1.
In both cases, f and hence Ω equals zero (see (7)), so that ∂π1/∂z0
a =0 . 6
6If complete emigration of the b-types occurs, so that θ1 =1 ,t h e nπ1 =1h o l d sa s
well, implying G = 0 along with f = 0. However, if π1 = 1 holds for a range θ1 values
lying below 1, then while f>0, G in (10) will again equal zero, yielding ∂π1/∂z0
a =0 .
Thus, substantial but incomplete emigration of the b-types can also yield a zero value for
this derivative.
83.3 Solving the choice problem
Using (10), the choice problem for the a-types can now be solved by choosing
z0



























b) > 0. (12)
is the type-a utility gain from being decisive in period 1.






a, while u 
b(z0
a) is negative, Va is increasing over this range
of z0
a values. Observe that this conclusion obtains regardless of whether Ω
equals zero, so that it holds even at z0
a values near z∗
b where no one emigrates.
Next, observe that since Ω(z∗
a) > 0 holds under the maintained assumptions,
∂Va/∂z0
a is positive at z0
a = z∗
a,w h e r eu 
a = 0. Since values in the range
(z∗
b,z∗
a] therefore cannot be optimal, the preferred z0
a level must lie above z∗
a,
at some point where both u 
a(z0
a) < 0a n dΩ> 0 hold and (12) equals zero.
Note that since complete b-type emigration yields an Ω value of zero
while requiring z0
a >z ∗
a and hence u 
a(z0
a) < 0, the optimality condition (12)
cannot be satisﬁed under these circumstances. Thus, the optimal z0
a yields
incomplete emigration of the b-types. Intuitively, at the optimum, there must
be some marginal gain from increasing z0
a to balance the loss from distorting
period-0 consumption. Once all the b-types have emigrated, such gains have
been exhausted, indicating that z0
a has been increased too far.
Thus, in the period-0 election, the type-a candidate proposes an extreme
government policy, higher than his already-high ideal point. By repeating
this argument for the b-types, an analogous conclusion emerges. In particu-
lar, the policy level proposed by the type-b candidate is also extreme, lying
below z∗
b, his already-low ideal point. It is important to note that, because
the type-a optimality condition (11) does not involve z0
b,t h et y p e - a choice
is independent of the proposed policy of the b-types. Since an analogous
conclusion holds for the type-b choice, interaction between the types plays
no role in their extreme choices. Summarizing yields
Proposition 1. Urban extremism characterizes policy proposals in the model.
The z proposed by the high-demand candidate lies above his type’s ideal point,
9and the z proposed by the low-demand candidate lies below his type’s ideal
point.
4 Intercommunity Analysis
Although emigration is the crucial element in our model, the preceding anal-
ysis has said little about the destinations of the emigrants or about the func-
tioning of the entire system of cities. It is not our goal to provide a complete
equilibrium model, but some discussion of these issues can be provided.
A particularly simple picture emerges if we imagine that the economy
contains many homogeneous type-a and type-b cities, along with a set of
heterogeneous cities like those considered in the analysis. Since the residents
of the homogeneous cities would have no incentive to induce emigration of
any of their residents, each would set policy at the ideal point for its type
(z∗
a or z∗
b) in both periods. In such a setting, emigrants from a heterogeneous
city would relocate to a homogeneous city inhabited by individuals of their
type. In this case, the outside type-b utility level appearing in (4) would
satisfy ub = ub(z∗
b), the utility achieved at the ideal point.
Random voter turnout in each heterogeneous city would determine which
type is decisive in the period-0 election and thus the identities of the emi-
grants subsequently leaving the city. Depending on the vote outcome, some
cities would generate type-a emigrants and some would generate type-b em-
igrants, with both groups relocating to homogeneous cities for their type.
Because inducement of complete emigration is not optimal, each heteroge-
neous city would remain so in period 1, although its population would show
an increase in the share of the decisive group from period 0.
This scenario is, of course, incomplete because it does not explain why
some cities are initially homogeneous and some initially heterogeneous. But
it does suggest that emigration induced by extremist policies may push the
economy toward a more-homogeneous collection of cities.
In a more satisfactory analysis, the initial collection of citieswould exhibit
arbitrary population compositions, with all cities possibly heterogeneous. In
this case, migration from one heterogeneous city to another may occur, so
that a representative city might both generate emigrants and receive incom-
ing migrants following the period-0 election. However, since our model is not
set up to handle this possibility, major changes would be required to provide
the requisite analysis. Such a task is left for future work.
105 Further applications
Our essential idea is that a voter may favor a policy that hurts him in the
current period if (a) it hurts others more, (b) thereby inducing emigration
of these individuals, and (c) thus making it more likely that the policy in
the future is close to the voter’s preferences. The general principle is a
powerful one, predicting that, when current policy can aﬀect future policy,
the majority in the current period will never favor a policy at its ideal point.
Starting at the type-a ideal point, consider a small increase in the policy
variable. Because z∗
a is the type-a optimum, this change has only a second-
order eﬀect on the utility of the a-types. But the move away from z∗
a has
a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the utility of the b-types (whose ideal point diﬀers),
inducing some of them to emigrate from the city. Thus, the type-a ideal
point cannot be optimal.
Moreover, our analysis can be extended to consider policy in multiple
dimensions rather than along only one dimension. In the spatial model, a
voter has an ideal point, with utility decreasing for any movement away from
that point. Then, in the initial period, a voter would favor a policy that
lies away from his ideal point and induces emigration of people with ideal
points diﬀerent from his. The direction of movement away from the ideal
point would be chosen to maximize emigration for a given reduction in the
voter’s own utility.
While our model focuses on the choice of a government policy, the general
idea can apply much more broadly. For example, union members may favor
labor contracts that appeal to certain types of people but not others. Thus,
if the current members have large families, the union membership may favor
fringe beneﬁts given to children over a cash payment that could be even
larger than the cost of the beneﬁts. Such a compensation package will induce
workerswho also havelarge familiesto jointhe union whilecausing unmarried
workers to ﬁnd its jobs unattractive. Such a change of composition in the
union membership could lead the union to favor family-oriented beneﬁts in
the future.
Our approach can apply not only to policies that cause emigration of
residents, but also to policies that expel particular industries from a city.
For example, residents may fear that polluting ﬁrms exert excessive political
inﬂuence in the choice of environmental standards. By adopting stringent
environmental policies in the current period, policies more stringent than
those that would maximize current utility, voters may encourage some of the
11polluting ﬁrms to exit the city. This change will reduce the industry’s politi-
cal inﬂuence in the future, beneﬁtting the residents. Thus, while a stringent
policy may appear to result from strongly pro-environmental groups or vot-
ers, the policy may actually indicate a desire to reduce anti-environmental
pressures in the future.
12References
[1] Aldrich, John H. (1983) “A Downsian spatial model with party activism.”
American Political Science Review, 77: 974-990.
[2] Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti (1995) “The political economy of
budget deﬁcits,” IMF Staﬀ Papers, 42: 1-31.
[3] Alesina, Alberto, and Guido Tabellini (1988) “Credibility and politics.”
European Economic Review, 32: 542-550.
[4] Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997) “An economic model of rep-
resentative democracy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112: 85-114.
[5] Epple, Dennis and Thomas Romer (1991) “Mobility and redistribution.”
Journal of Political Economy, 99: 828-858.
[6] Hoyt, William H. and Kangoh Lee (2003) “Subsidies as sorting devices.”
Journal of Urban Economics, 53: 436-457.
[7] Glaeser, Edward L. and Andrei Shleifer (2005) “The Curley eﬀect: The
economics of shaping the electorate.” Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 21(1): 1-19.
[8] Glazer, Amihai (1989) “Politics and the choice of durability.” American
Economic Review, 79: 1207-1213.
[9] Glazer, Amihai, Mark Gradstein, and Kai Konrad (1998) “The electoral
politics of extreme policies.” Economic Journal, 108: 1677-1685.
[10] Iannacone, Laurence (1997) “Introduction to the economics of religion.”
Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 1465-1495.
[11] Nastassine, Stanislav (2005) “Fiscal federalism, citizen-candidate mobil-
ity and political competition.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Universityof Konstanz.
[12] Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski (1996) “A model of political com-
petition with citizen candidates.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111:
65-96.
[13] Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina (1990) “Voting on the budget
deﬁcit.” American Economic Review, 80: 37-49.
13[14] Tiebout, Charles M. (1956) “A pure theory of local expenditures.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 64: 416-421.
[15] Wilson, John D. (1998) “Imperfect solutions to the musical suburbs
problem.” In David Pines, Ephraim Sadka, and Itzhak Zilca, eds., Top-
ics in Public Economics: Theoretical and Applied Analysis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
14